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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-3864

MICHAEL WALKER; ERNIE HEFFNER;
JEFFERSON MEMORIAL FUNERAL HOME;
BETTY FREY,
Appellants
v.
JODI FLITTON; JOSEPH A. FLUEHR, III; ANDREW MAMARY;
JANICE MANNAL; GARY L. MORRISON; MICHAEL D. MORRISON;
DONALD J. MURPHY; JAMES O. PINKERTON

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-02252)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 24, 2003
Before: SCIRICA*, Chief Judge, AM BRO and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2003)

OPINION
________________________
*Judge Scirica commenced his term as Chief Judge on May 4, 2003.

AM BRO, Circuit Judge
This case involves a dispute about the extent to which the Pennsylvania State
Board of Funeral Directors can regulate the sale of future funeral services to the living
(known as pre-need funeral services). Appellants filed a civil rights action in federal
court accusing the Board of violating their First Amendm ent rights because of its
resolution (and decisions interpreting that resolution) holding in effect that only licensed
funeral directors may provide those services. The District Court dismissed the action
under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine, reasoning that reaching the merits of appellants’
claims would require it to revisit a final order of the Pennsylvania state court. Because
appellants were not a party to the state court decision to which the District Court referred,
we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, and we reverse.
1.

Facts and Procedural History

The Board issued a resolution stating, in essence, that giving information about
prices or describing the funeral services or tangible item s available from any specific
funeral home for the funeral services of a person then-living constitutes the practice of

1

According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, only the United States Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review a state-court decision. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923), the Supreme Court, in reviewing an attempt to seek relief from a statecourt judgm ent, stated that “no court of the United States other than this court could
entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment.” In District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that “the United States District Court is without authority to review final
determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings.”
2

funeral directing. Subsequently, the Board found two individuals, Faye Morey and
Andrew D. Ferguson, guilty of the unauthorized practice of funeral directing as a result of
their involvement in the types of activities described in this resolution. The
Commonwealth Court affirmed those adjudications in Ferguson v. Pennsylvania State Bd.
of Funeral Directors, 768 A.2d 393 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). None of the appellants in
this action was a party to those proceedings.
Appellants Walker (a licensed insurance agent who sells funeral insurance), Frey
(an em ployee of Preneed, a company that sells funeral item s and financial packages to
finance funeral services to living persons), Heffner (a licensed funeral director who sells
pre-need funeral services financed by Preneed), and Jefferson Memorial Funeral Home (a
licensed funeral home that sells pre-need funeral services that are funded by policies sold
by Walker) filed suit against the members of the Pennsylvania Board in District Court
alleging violations of their rights to commercial speech under the First Amendment. The
District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, concluding that, because the Commonwealth Court had adjudicated the
constitutional claims asserted by appellants in Ferguson, 768 A.2d 393, this suit was
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because “Pennsylvania courts have already
adjudicated the identical issue presented in this case,” the District Court concluded that
“[p]laintiffs are seeking to have us serve as a de facto appellate court to review the
reasoned judgment of the Commonwealth Court on an issue designed for that Court’s

3

interpretation.” This appeal followed. 2
It is well-settled in our Circuit that “Rooker-Feldman does not bar individual
constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier state court litigation.” FOCUS v.
Allegheny County Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also 18B Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4469.1 (2d ed. 2002) (“An important parallel to
preclusion doctrine is found in the rule that [the] Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
defeat federal jurisdiction when a nonparty brings the action, even though [the] decision
may involve matters inextricably intertwined with a state judgm ent.”) (emphasis added).
Indeed, defendants “recognize that this Circuit has applied a blanket rule that RookerFeldman does not apply to third parties.” (Appellee’s Br. at 9.) As appellants in this case
were not parties to Ferguson, it was error for the District Court to grant defendants’
motion to dismiss under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Defendants urge that “because many courts have held differently and applied
Rooker-Feldman to nonparties,” we should “reconsider [our] position.” (Appellee’s Br.
at 9.) (citing Lemonds v. St. Louis Cty., 222 F.3d 488, 494-96 (8th Cir. 2000)). Our
internal operating procedures provide that a panel must follow our Court's precedent,
which may only be overturned by the Court sitting en banc. Internal Operating

2

We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order dismissing the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is plenary. Gulla v. North Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
4

Procedures § 9.1. To the extent that defendants wish to persuade us to reconsider our
judgments in FOCUS and Valenti, those arguments are more appropriately addressed to
the Court via a petition for rehearing en banc.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court dismissing the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.

By the Court,

/s/Thomas L. Ambro
Circuit Judge
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